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Medicare Should, but Cannot, Consider Cost:
Legal Impediments to a Sound Policy
JACQUELINE

Foxt

INTRODUCTION

There is much discussion of the political, philosophical
and economic issues surrounding how and when to control
the cost of Medicare. However, most people are unaware
that there are profound legal impediments that must be
addressed before any other steps are taken.
Under the enabling statute for Medicare passed in
1965, and all subsequent amendments, it seems clear that
Medicare cannot consider the cost of medical care when
deciding if a particular treatment will be paid for by
Medicare. The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS) has historically controlled cost by issuing coverage
decisions that have used cost in a covert manner to limit
the care provided. The motive for this covert activity can
perhaps best be explained by recognizing that CMS
functions in a dangerous landscape, one littered with
political landmines likely to explode if care is rationed and
economic landmines just as likely to explode if care is paid
for.
This article discusses in depth the legal issues that
CMS, and its reformists, must resolve before any
meaningful change is possible. It further suggests that
legislative change should come from Congress in two ways.
The first is with an explicit statutory grant of power to

t The author would like to thank the Greenwall Foundation, Yale University's
Bioethics Center, the Donaghue Foundation and CMS for their financial
support during the writing of this article. Furthermore, the time and wisdom of
a number of people have been of immeasurable help in this endeavor (none of
whom, however, can be held responsible for the content). These include Gregg
Bloche, Ruth Faden, Theodore Marmor, Emma Coleman Jordan, Steven
Goldberg, Madison Powers, Sean Tunis and Mark Schlesinger.
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CMS to consider cost-effectiveness of medical technology
when making coverage decisions.
It is tempting to follow the lead of many in the area of
agency law and argue that CMS should have the power to
expand its regulatory reach as circumstances require
without need of legislative intervention. As is discussed
later in this article, CMS has tried and failed to adopt
regulations to accomplish this. While Eskridge and others
believe in the theory of expanding agency power and the
need for a flexible reading of agency enabling statutes, in
the case of Medicare that theory is a poor fit. An agency
right that is premised on a strained reading of its statutory
enabling language and is in direct conflict with its
legislative history is not going to be perceived as politically
legitimate in an area as fundamentally complex and
morally contested as rationing of healthcare.
The second call for legislative change is to address a
more difficult problem than mere cost-effectiveness.
Recognizing that some medical technology is both effective
and extremely expensive, a system needs to be created for
deciding when something is simply too expensive to pay for.
Congress once created a process for deciding when to close
military bases.' A commission was appointed with a grant
of power allowing it to determine which bases required
closing. That process was created in recognition of the
political impossibility of managing these difficult costsaving measures through the traditional budget process. A
similar and ongoing structure should be created for
considering Medicare coverage of medical technologies
whose projected or actual cost will have a significant impact
on the Medicare budget overall. 2
Health insurance companies in this country have
historically applied CMS coverage decisions to their own
members. When CMS limits access to care for the elderly, it
is in effect limited for all Americans whose insurance
1. Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment
Act, Pub. L. No. 100-526 §§ 200-209, 102 Stat. 2623 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 2689
(1988)). This law created a commission to oversee base closings. The
commission expired in 1995. See also Edwin R. Render, The Privatizationof A
Military Installation: A Misapplication of The Base Closure and Realignment
Act, 44 NAVAL L. REV. 245 (1997) (giving a description of this program).
2. This process would, by definition, be reserved for those technologies that
do not create net cost-saving opportunities by replacing current treatments.
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companies follow Medicare coverage decisions. This means
CMS is currently making broad-reaching resource
allocation decisions. It is to everyone's benefit to have a
more rational, politically transparent and explicit decisionmaking process to allocate our resources. Without change to
the Medicare statute, that process cannot be developed.
The legal analysis of the Medicare cost issue requires a
multifaceted approach. This article considers both the
official and unofficial legislative history of the relevant
language of the original Medicare Act of 1965. It further
examines changes in both medicine and the healthcare
system since 1965, attempts made by Congress and
Medicare to tackle the problem of cost head on and what
courts have done in interpreting the relevant statutory
language. Furthermore, the article contains an analysis of
what the Supreme Court is likely to do in light of its recent
decisions if faced with this issue and what it should do in
the same circumstances. Finally, the question as to whether
CMS is qualified to make this sort of decision for our society
is examined.
Looming over all of this is the question of how best to
deal with particularly thorny resource allocation issues in
our society. Is this an area where Madisonian democratic
principles that would encourage a public and spirited
legislative debate simply fail us? It would appear at first
glance that this is so. Must agencies move beyond powers
expressly given them by Congress because these are areas
in which we cannot manage to legislate properly? The
author would argue that we must simply try harder to
develop imaginative and socially palatable solutions that
have a firmer base of political legitimacy. The risk of not
doing so is that rationing will continue to occur in an
irrational and imprecise way and we will continue to risk
waste of scarce resources.
Buried in the recently enacted Medicare Prescription
Drug Plan is a small paragraph directing the Secretary of
Health and Human Services ("HHS") to make available to
the public the factors considered in making national3
coverage determinations for coverage of Medicare benefits.
These determinations are how Medicare often decides the
3. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 731, 117 Stat. 2066, 2349 (2003).
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scope of coverage for expensive new medical technologies.
For almost twenty years the Medicare Program has tried to
promulgate criteria for these determinations that would
include the cost of medical technology when deciding if
Medicare will provide coverage for the care.
What Congress has directed HHS to do raises a breadth
of issues that need to be critically examined in hopes that
HHS can develop criteria that both protect Medicare's
financial stability and provide the broadest possible access
to health care technology. The effect of this small paragraph
in the law should be felt not only by those concerned with
health law but also those in agency law, constitutional law
and those more broadly concerned with how our
government should properly determine how or if we should
ration health care and other scarce resources.
By ordering HHS to promulgate explicit criteria,
Congress has opened a Pandora's Box. It is likely that HHS
cannot promulgate criteria that accurately reflect how they
decide about coverage of expensive medical technology or
how they should make these decisions. They implicitly
consider cost in shaping the coverage of many expensive
technologies. This law has the potential to force into the
open this implicit process, exposing a problem that has been
simmering under cover almost since the beginning of the
Medicare program. With this action, Congress may have
actually deprived Medicare of the way it has coped with the
challenge of cost until now. Once Medicare commits to
explicit factors, its decisions will be analyzed to see if it
complies with those factors. Litigation challenging the use
of those factors will be a logical next step. Implicit cost
factors could then be exposed and a Medicare coverage
decision overturned by the courts because of them.
I. HEART TRANSPLANT COVERAGE: AN EXAMPLE OF THE ROLE
OF COST IN COVERAGE DECISIONS

What follows is an example of the use of implicit or
covert cost considerations in a Medicare coverage decision.
In 1980, Medicare's national office discovered that a local
Medicare administrator had been paying for heart
transplants performed at Stanford University's medical
center in California. The Medicare program was then
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administered by the Health Care Financing Administration
("HCFA"). 4 HCFA published a notice in the Federal Register
announcing it would no longer cover heart transplants until
further studies produced appropriate criteria. The issues
selection and
HCFA was concerned about included "patient
5
potential social and economic implications."
Lurking over HCFA's concerns was the previous
decade's introduction of the End Stage Renal Disease
Program, under which Medicare extended benefits to all
Americans suffering from kidney disease who required
dialysis or kidney transplants. This program faced rapidly
growing costs. Patricia Harris, at this time the Secretary of
the Department of Health and Human Services ("DHHS")
expressly said cost effectiveness would be taken into
consideration by Medicare in making its coverage decision
about heart transplants. 6 HCFA paid for a study whose
purpose was to assess the criteria described in the Federal
Register notice. Secretary Harris wanted new technologies
generally to be assessed for their social consequences,
among other factors. 7 The contract to conduct the study
assessing heart transplants was awarded in September of
1981 for the purpose of analyzing "the scientific, economic
and ethical consequences of Medicare coverage for heart
transplants. "8
HCFA had every reason to worry about the possible
costs of heart transplants. Prior to contracting for this
study, its own internal studies had predicted enormous
potential costs for heart transplants if they were provided
to all potential recipients. Organ transplant recipients
require continual care to prevent organ rejection
throughout their lifetimes. HCFA generated estimated
continuing costs for recipients ranging from $2500 a year to

4. Medicare has been administered by a number of different federal offices,
the current one being the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, known
as "CMS." HCFA was the immediate predecessor of CMS.
5. Exclusion of Heart Transplantation Procedures From Medicare Coverage,
45 Fed.Reg. 52,296, 52,297 (Aug.6, 1980).
6. See Ward Casscells, M.D., Heart Transplantation: Recent Policy
Developments, 315 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1365 (1986).

7. See R.W. Evans, Coverage and Reimbursement for Heart Transplantation,
2 INT'L J. TECH. ASSESSMENT IN HEALTH CARE 425, 425 (1986).
8.Id. at 425.
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$15,000 a year per person after surgery costs. The total cost
estimate for the program ranged from $150 million to $4.5
billion in 1979 dollars. 9
The HCFA funded study, completed in 1985, revealed a
number of possible money-saving features of heart
transplants. The lack of suitable organs for transplantation
was going to severely limit the hearts available, thus
limiting the number of recipients. The lead investigator of
the study, Roger Evans, in light of his charge to consider
economics, ethics and science, recommended a series of
limiting criteria for HCFA's approval for the stated purpose
of saving money. 10 His recommendations included difficult
criteria for hospitals to meet in order to be considered
qualified to perform heart transplants. Criteria for patient
selection could almost entirely exclude the Medicare
population from access to the procedure by limiting it to
people less than sixty-five years of age, among other
things." These criteria would serve to minimize the
"economic implications of Medicare coverage," 1 2 according to
Dr. Evans.
After the publication of this study and before Medicare
adopted a coverage guideline for heart transplants, Dr.
Evans worried that coverage decisions were "under
pressure to be converted to allocation and rationing
decisions."'13 Meanwhile, there had been a change in
presidential administrations and a change in the language
used by those at Medicare making these decisions.
Retreating from statements of explicit economic concerns,
William Roper, director of Medicare in 1986, stated that
safety and efficacy were the major concerns for heart
transplant coverage and that the "decision was not a costdriven decision."' 4 He also said that cost was an implicit
part of every decision Medicare makes, and, in the same
interview, spoke of Medicare fears of a repeat of the cost
9. See id. at 430.

10. See id. at 435.
11. Medicare coverage begins at age 65 for those who do not qualify earlier
because of a disability.
12. Evans, supra note 7, at 435.
13. Id. at 446.
14. Julie Kosterlitz, Picking Up The Tab: Medicare Coverage of Heart
Transplants,NAT'LJ. 18:30 at 1825, 1827 (1986).
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explosion in the End Stage Renal Disease program. This
program was by then facing projected annual costs thirtyfive times higher than originally estimated. 15 He thought
needed to address how Medicare should consider
Congress
16
cost.

Ronald Milhorn, a senior administrator with Medicare
at that time, interviewed during the research for this paper,
made it clear that designing a coverage policy for heart
transplants that limited potential costs was a primary goal
the
for Medicare. He also said this directive came from 17
White House as well as from senior Medicare employees.
By focusing on developing a policy that built on the
limited number of hearts available for transplant, the
problem becomes a blameless tragedy of access to a scarce
resource. This is not to imply that Medicare could have
changed the amount of available organs for donation, but
rather that they embraced this as a money-saving aspect of
organ transplant coverage. With no further explicit mention
concerns, HCFA
of economics or cost-effectiveness
published a notice in the Federal Register in April of 1987
that said heart transplants are reasonable and necessary
when specific criteria are met.' 8 The criteria were the ones
recommended by Dr. Evans in 1985 as the best from an
economic standpoint, including limiting criteria for
transplant center approval and age limits that kept most
Medicare recipients from qualifying. The idea is to provide
organs to those most likely to receive the greatest benefit
from them. It is not based on a finding that heart
transplants would be of no benefit to those over age sixtyfive.
Recently, Medicare has been in the process of
determining coverage criteria for a medical device called a
left-ventricle assist device ("L-VAD"). The L-VAD has been
in use for some time as a device that helps potential heart
transplant recipients survive long enough to receive a
15. Id.
16. See id.
17. Interview with Ronald Milhorn in Baltimore, Md. (July 2, 2002). This is
one of a series of interviews conducted by the author during the summer of 2002
with people involved in the earliest days of Medicare implementation.
18. Medicare Program; Criteria for Medicare Coverage of Heart Transplants
52 Fed. Reg. 10,935 (Apr. 6, 1987).
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heart. This use is known as a "bridge to transplant." The
new approval is for the L-VAD to be used as an end stage
therapy, meaning as a treatment for those who do not
qualify for a heart transplant. This has the potential to reopen the door to all of the people over age sixty-five who
could benefit from some form of a new heart, whether a
donated organ or an artificial component, but had been shut
out by earlier criteria for heart transplants.
L-VAD technology is merely one example of the
expensive technologies on the near horizon. There are other
technologies with enormous financial implications that
Medicare has to grapple with. Implantable defibrillators,
for example, have the potential to cost far more for
Medicare than it can easily absorb. 19 As the heart
transplant story shows, CMS has not had a consistent
perspective on what role cost is allowed to play in Medicare
coverage decisions about new or existing medical technology
or how that role of cost is implemented. What has occurred
in the past is a finagling of coverage decisions by Medicare
officials who are implicitly or explicitly concerned with
saving money. Cost has and continues to play a significant
role, poorly defined and perhaps poorly implemented, and
we now have rationing of healthcare by Medicare based
solely or in part on the cost of a procedure. This is done by
shaping coverage decisions so that medical criteria for when
Medicare will pay for a procedure are determined at least in
part by a desire to minimize the number of procedures
performed, thus saving money.
II. THE PASSAGE OF THE MEDICARE ACT AND THE ORIGINAL
MEANING OF "REASONABLE AND NECESSARY"

This section of this article analyzes the circumstances
of the passage of the Medicare Act of 1965 as it relates to
the issue of what Medicare covers, specifically the official
and unofficial history of the phrase "reasonable and
necessary." That phrase is the statutory language that
must be interpreted for all Medicare coverage decisions. It
was put in the Medicare Act at the last minute, lifted from
an Aetna policy for government employees. This section of
19. See Mark B. McClellan, M.D. & Sean R. Tunis, M.D., Medicare Coverage
of ICDs, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 222 (2005), where the authors discuss how CMS
should frame coverage of implantable defibrillators.
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this article also describes drafters' concerns about cost,
concerns about interference with physicians' rights to
practice, and other issues which serve to illuminate what
was meant by reasonable and necessary at that time.
This history, both legislative and political, is necessary
for the discussion here. It is not widely known and has
importance for two reasons. The first is that the relevant
language has not changed since the Act was passed in 1965,
making its original context important for assessing what it
was meant to accomplish. The second is because this
history illuminates the political pitfalls still operating for
those who would modify Medicare.
The Medicare Act was passed in 1965. This brought
health care insurance to Americans over the age of 65. Prior
to its passage, most Americans received health insurance
from their employers, paid for healthcare themselves or
received charity care. Insurers did not want to insure the
elderly, who then found it extremely difficult to handle the
expenses of any serious illness. The passage of the law was
the result of a complex alignment of political forces that had
taken almost eighty years to bring together. In 1883,
Germany created a universal health plan and was the first
modern western society to do so. In the United States there
were attempts to have Congress pass legislation providing
for universal health coverage as early as 1902. Legislation
calling for national health insurance was formally proposed
every year from 1939 until 1965.20 This idea was a plank in
numerous political platforms for decades.
There were clear opponents, spearheaded by the
American Medical Association. 21 Their primary concern was
become
would
healthcare
government-funded
that
government controlled healthcare. The AMA, reflecting
their worry of potential involvement far beyond payment,
for national health
labeled President Truman's proposals
22
insurance "socialized medicine."
While universal healthcare seemed unlikely to pass, the
creation of the social security program opened a door to the

20. See THEODORE R. MARMOR, THE POLITICS OF MEDICARE (2d ed. 2000).
21.

See

FRANK D. CAMPION, THE AMA AND US HEALTH POLICY SINCE 1940

256 (1984).
22. MARMOR,

supra note 20, at 9.
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government providing some sort of health coverage for the
elderly, paid for by the social security tax. Older Americans
were an easily definable group whose reasons for requiring
assistance were straightforward and not related to any
personal failure. On average, they had less health
insurance coverage, lower incomes and poorer health than
younger groups. 23 Another draw for selecting the elderly for
a proposed plan was the fact that the group was the one all
Americans could look forward to joining. Rather than being
a plan for the
a question of us versus them, this presented
24
inevitable time when us became them.
President John F. Kennedy ran for election in the late
1950s on a platform that included a Medicare-type program
for the elderly. After his election, he failed to move his
legislation on this issue through Congress. The AMA had
put its considerable weight behind blocking him in this
area. His proposal of 1961 was known as the KingAnderson bill. It was narrow in its focus and provided for
coverage of ninety days of hospital care and no physician
services.
Still trying to move the issue forward, Kennedy gave a
speech from Madison Square Garden on the evening of May
20, 1962 on this Medicare-type proposal. It was televised
nationally. The AMA responded by renting Madison Square
Garden that same night, filing a rebuttal speech among the
left over debris of posters, balloons and colored tissue paper.
It then purchased time for the next night on NBC and aired
their rebuttal nationally at 8 p.m., May 21.25
The King-Anderson bill focused on relieving the elderly
of specific financial burdens. While the underlying issue
was access to healthcare, the bill as proposed did very little
to ensure this, with no coverage for the day-to-day expenses
of healthcare. 26
The constant hammering by the AMA was effective in
two ways. First, Congress was passing no legislation.

23. See id. at 15. See also Madison Powers, The Future of Medicare: Some
Ethical Reflections on Its Social Purpose, in THE ETHICS OF MEDICARE REFORM,
at 6 (2002).
24. See Powers, supra note 23, at 10.
25. CAMPION, supra note 21, at 264.

26. MARMOR, supra note 20, at 49.
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Second, relevant here, all proposals were being carefully
drafted to avoid the appearance of government interfering
27
in physicians' decisions regarding their patients' care.
Wilbur Mills, Chairman of the House of Representatives
Ways and Means Committee, was opposed to the KingAnderson bill. He was also a powerful southern Democrat.
This gave him the power to prevent the bill from28 making it
out of his committee and it never came to a vote.
Kennedy was assassinated in 1963, bringing his vicepresident, Lyndon Baines Johnson, into office as President.
President Johnson was an experienced legislator and
known for being highly capable in moving legislation
through Congress from his time there. 29 He embarked on a
plan to pass Kennedy's legislative agenda and used all of
his considerable skills and power to get Congress to
30
seriously consider issues they had rejected before.
Chairman Mills changed his stance on the King-Anderson
bill, allowing extensive hearings to be held in Congress on
the issue. There was a presidential election looming and no
action was taken on the bill prior to that. Johnson's
overwhelming win, garnering two out of every three votes,
about the popularity of his
sent a strong signal to Congress
31
agenda for social programs.
By early 1965, the King-Anderson bill had enough votes
to pass. The issue in both the House and Senate was what
the final bill would look like. In December of 1964, (after

27. The idea of patient autonomy was not a dominant one in the 1950s and
1960s. It would not emerge as such until the 1970s and would then only
increase in influence. The concern in this earlier time was protecting the
physician's autonomy to practice medicine as he saw fit, without government
interference.
28. See MARMOR, supra note 20, at 51, 53.
29. See Interview by Joe B. Frantz with Wilbur Mills (Nov.2, 1971), Wilbur
Mills Oral History Interview I (transcript available in the Lyndon Baines
Johnson Library and Museum) available at http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/
johnson/archives.honoralhistory.hom/ Mills-w/millsl.pdf (last visited Apr. 25,
2005) [hereinafter Interview I]; Interview by Michael L. Gillette with Wilbur
Mills (Mar. 25, 1987), Wilbur Mills Oral History Interview II (transcript
available in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and Museum), available at
http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/oralhistory.hom/Millsw/mills2.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2005).

30. See id.
31. See id.
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the presidential election and Johnson's resounding victory)
Mills gave a speech where he worried that there were
"discrepancies between popular conceptions of Medicare"
and the proposal embodied in the bill still on the table. 32 In
an interview given a decade later, Mills explained that
Medicare, as initially proposed, would only provide coverage
for 25% of a person's medical expenses due to the lack of
coverage for physician services and care given outside of a
strictly hospital setting. Mills worried that the elderly
would do the 33math and realize there had been a false
promise made.
While it appeared that passage of some form of
Medicare bill was inevitable, there was an intense debate in
Congress. The Republicans and the AMA headed the
opposition. Rather than continuing to oppose all coverage,
they now proposed a bill for a program that would be means
tested, administered by the states and would provide a far
richer benefit plan than the King-Anderson proposal. 34 This
transformed the debate into one about the scope of coverage
Medicare would provide and who would receive the care.
This was the problem that Mills was referring to in his
speech, how to craft a program that would not disappoint
the recipients.
The proposal on the table provided for a catastrophic
hospital plan, and closely resembles what became Medicare
Part A. But there was the desire to provide a fuller plan,
one that would do a "complete job"35 of providing medical
care. This concern led much of the public debate, as
recorded in the press and the published legislative
history. 36 This is where the power of the AMA strangely
impacted on the Medicare program. The AMA worried that
providing a minimum of care to all the elderly would not fix
the worst problems of the worst off.3 7 It was in favor of
providing full access to medical care to the truly needy, and
32. MARMOR, supra note 20, at 56.

33. See Interview I, supra note 29, at 11. Note the similarity between this
concern and arguments made during the recent debate over a Medicare
prescription drug benefit.
34. See CAMPION, supra note 21, at 257.
35. Id.
36. See S. REP. No. 89-404 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943.
37. See CAMPION, supra note 21, at 53-258.
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in its efforts to show how Medicare failed to provide this it
highlighted the troubling gaps in the Medicare proposal it
opposed. It isn't clear that the AMA actually wanted a
program to provide government-sponsored healthcare to
anybody, but in its efforts to show the logical flaws in the
Medicare bill, the AMA helped turn it into a far more
generous entitlement.
Much of Johnson's success in passing Kennedy's
legislative agenda came form his ability to utilize the
existing power structure in Congress. Mills was a crucial
ally in orchestrating how the House dealt with this
legislation, particularly when it became a fluid and
dramatic drafting and negotiating session. 38 The structure
of Congress in the mid-1960s was very different from what
it is now in that Congress did not have the expert staff
available on its own payroll that it does now. The President
tended to allow Congress to have access to the expertise of
the different executive branch agencies when relevant
legislation was being proposed and drafted. Johnson was
extremely generous in this area. He made outright loans of
staff. Social Security Administration ("SSA") staffers were
assigned to assist Congressional staffers in drafting various
Medicare versions and were told that for the duration
of the
39
project, their duty would be entirely to Congress.
The last forty-eight hours of the Medicare debate
brought together the different concerns of House members
in a form also palatable to the Senate. 40 The fundamental
change was in adding the benefits that became Medicare
Part B. This was the physician services section. Part B
would make Medicare a more complete plan, less of an
''empty promise." The hospital coverage became Part A.
There was no provision made for coverage of preventive
care and the premise of Part B, as with A, was to be there
for cases of emergency and high costs. The annual
deductible for Part B was fifty dollars, which was thought
to be enough to pay for four doctor's office visits in any
given year. At the time, this was the average cost and

38. Milhorn Interview, supra note 17.
39. See id. Milhorn was one of the people assigned by Johnson to draft the
Medicare Act and related this story.
40. See generally Interview I, supra note 29 and MARMOR, supra note 20.
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average number of office visits in the country. 41 To
a lowlegislators at that time, the typical office visit was
42
technology encounter involving limited or no tests.
To quiet the AMA and others worried about socialized
medicine, the statute was to include a strict statement that
government would not interfere with the doctor-patient
relationship. 43 The concerns about cost were focused on
unscrupulous over-utilization of services and were
addressed with provisions for a limited utilization review of
the same physician decisions meant to be protected by the
statute's language described in the previous paragraph.
These provisions for cost control were not the subjects of
much debate. They were weak in their structure, conducted
by hospital panels made up of the admitting physicians.
The fear of government intrusion through this mechanism
was minimal. 44
Part B was introduced with a different financing
mechanism than Part A, altering the payment structure of
Medicare at the last minute. Part A is financed through a
payroll tax, whereas Part B is paid for by the individuals
who receive it, usually as a deduction from their social
security checks.
Medicare was thus clearly limited by design as to what
types of care it provided coverage for. For example, as
described above, Medicare did not cover preventive care,
such as yearly examinations, and also did not cover
eyeglasses .45
Within the broad areas that were covered, the specific
limitation is as follows: "No payment may be made under
part A or part B for any expenses incurred for items or
services which ... are not reasonable and necessary for the

41. Milhorn, supra note 17.
42. See Interview I, supranote 29.
43. See 42 U.S.C. §1395 (2002) ("Prohibition against any Federal
interference"). "Nothing in this title [42 U.S.C. § 1395 et seq.] shall be construed
to authorize any Federal officer or employee to exercise any supervision or
control over the practice of medicine or the manner in which medical services
are provided." Id.
44. Interview with Marty Svolos, employee of SSA who served on the
original Medicare Implementation Task Force, in Baltimore, Md. (July 2, 2002).
45. See Milhorn, supra note 17.
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or to improve the
diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury 46
functioning of a malformed body member."
This language remains essentially unchanged from
when it was first passed in 1965. It represents the
standards that the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services ("CMS"), the agency that now administers
Medicare, considers when deciding whether or not to cover
any given procedure or technology. There has been much
written about the history of the Medicare Act but almost
nothing has been written about this particular section. A
review of the published formal legislative history reveals
little about its substantive meaning, but it is enlightening
as to meanings it was not meant to convey.
The overriding concerns in the legislative history were
to make sure the elderly received a high quality of medical
care and that providers were paid generously for providing
it. The most striking statement in the legislative history as
regards cost and coverage is the statement that the goal of
Medicare is to "encourage participating institutions,
of modern
agencies, and individuals to make the best
47
medicine more readily available to the aged."
Neither reasonable nor necessary appear in the
legislative history in relation to the statute section quoted
above. The word "reasonable" was discussed almost entirely
as it related to reimbursement rates that Medicare would
pay. These were discussed within the context that the rates
had to be generous enough. For example, "reasonable" was
discussed with regard to physician reimbursement, which,
it was said, would be reasonable if rates were aligned with
customary charges for similar 48services by that doctor or
other doctors in the community.
At another place in the debate, "reasonable" was used
in the context of setting reimbursements to hospitals at the
"adequate, normal, reasonable amount so hospitals are not
from treating
people
with
Medicare
discouraged
coverage." 49 The focus, again, was on a full scope of benefits

46. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A) (2002) ("Exclusions from coverage").
47. S. REP. No. 89-404, at 24 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943,
1965.
48. Id. at 7.
49. Id. at 27. This concern resulted in vast overpayments to hospitals in the
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being available to Medicare beneficiaries. Reimbursement
rates for hospitals were to be set to take into account
necessary and proper expenses incurred in rendering
services, including normal standby costs of equipment.
Reasonable costs also included depreciation of buildings
and equipment and necessary and proper interest on capital
indebtedness.50
It was noted that Medicare's payment structure was not
intended to reimburse hospitals for charity work, or for
treating the uninsured. The understanding was that
Medicare and its new companion, Medicaid, would already
be taking a large burden of charity care off of hospitals by
providing coverage for many of the people who previously
required charity and so further financing would be
unnecessary. 51 The only language that could be interpreted
as functioning to limit what care a Medicare patient could
get was in a brief discussion of reasonable and necessary.
There, it was stated that Medicare would pay for care "only
if it were a reasonable and necessary part of a sick person's
treatment," and costs would only be covered "where they
contribute meaningfully to the treatment of an illness or
injury. '52 The language was not defined or debated further.
Finally, it was noted that an assumption underlying the
cost estimates of Medicare in 1965 and into the future was
that there would be "development of new medical
techniques and procedures, with the resultant increased
expense." 53
Because Johnson loaned SSA personnel to Congress to
assist in drafting the legislation, these people have a unique
perspective on what considerations went into the language
that was eventually chosen. After Medicare became a law, it
was implemented as part of SSA. Many of those involved in
drafting the legislation from SSA then became part of the
first years of the Medicare program, something that was of great interest
during the Carter presidency, see CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., PRESIDENT
CARTER: 1978 47 (1979).

50. S. REP. No. 89-404, at 36, reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 1977.
This payment theory contributed to an enormous boom in hospital building. The
reimbursement for standby costs of equipment certainly encouraged hospitals to
purchase their own, often underutilized, expensive diagnostic equipment.
51. See S. REP. No. 89-404, at 27, reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 1978.

52. S. REP. No. 89-404, at 48, reprintedin 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 1989.
53. S. REP. No. 89-404, at 59, reprintedin 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 1999.
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original Medicare staff. From recent interviews and
correspondence with three of these SSA employees, it has
been possible to piece together some of what remained
unspoken by Congress on the public record at that time.
The three were Marty Svolos, a member of the original
Medicare Implementation Task Force, Robert Hoyer, one of
the primary drafters of Medicare, and Ronald Milhorn,
involved then and also active in national coverage decisions
made by Medicare through the 1990s.
From these interviews it is clear that there were
concerns about the potential costs of Medicare when it was
drafted. The primary concern was that a broadly worded
entitlement would lead to abuse in utilization, and this is
reflected in parts of the original statute as described earlier.
What quickly became the dominant concern after passage of
the Medicare Act was the real cost of the care it was
promising to cover. In the five years leading up to the
passage of the Medicare Act, medical costs had increased at
a rate greater than inflation. 54 Yet in the legislative history,
in the discussion of the probable cost of the proposed
Medicare program, the assumption was made that this rate
of increase would not continue. 55 This assumption was not
supported by any evidence, but was integral to the funding
estimates as to the predicted
cost of the program over the
first five years of coverage. 56
Robert Hoyer's recollections about drafting the
Medicare Act are illuminating with regard to the use of the
"reasonable and necessary" language.
When Chairman Mills surprised everyone and asked us to add
physician benefits to the King-Anderson Bill, we wrote the new
medical insurance provisions in a new Part B ... As I recall it, the
reasonable and necessary provision and other exclusions in §1862
were taken from an Aetna policy that was available to federal
employees at the time .... 57 It is my impression that [in 1965]
neither . . . commercial [insurance companies} or the Blue [Cross
Blue Shield plans] paid much attention to the reasonable and
necessary exclusions written into their policies. However, the
proponents of Medicare were always being called to show that the

54. See Milhorn Interview, supranote 17.
55. See S. REP. No. 89-404, at 24, reprintedin 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 1999.
56. See S. REP. No. 89-404, at 24, reprintedin 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 1999.
57. See also Svolos, supra note 44.
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program would not flood hospitals with healthy elderly patients
58
and our intention was to provide credible utilization safeguards.

This language was taken from an Aetna policy that the
federal government provided for its employees at that time.
The relevant passage in the Aetna policy is in the section
entitled "Exclusions" and states: "Charges listed on this and
the following page are not allowable: Charges for services
and supplies ... [n]ot reasonably necessary for treatment of
pregnancy, illness, or injury, or to improve the functioning
59
of a malformed body member."
There was a shift in the language from the Aetna policy
to the Medicare Act. Rather than having reasonable be a
modifier of necessary (reasonably necessary), it became its
own, independent, limiting criteria. 60 The item or service
under Medicare must be reasonable as well as necessary,
whereas in the Aetna policy it had to be reasonably
necessary. This structure has since been used by Medicare
to justify some criteria to be considered in making their
coverage assessments, as discussed in Part six of this
article.
Given that this language came from an Aetna policy,
the meaning of reasonable and necessary in the context of
private insurance plans at that time is relevant. For Aetna
and other insurance companies (including the Blue Cross
and Blue Shield plans) "reasonably necessary" was not an
effective cost-saving feature of health plans and was not
used as one. This can be illustrated by a fairly typical case
from that era, Aetna Life Insurance Company v. Sanders.61
In that case, involving surgery as a treatment of obesity,
the court was called upon to decide if surgery had been
reasonably necessary and whether it was covered under an
Aetna health insurance policy. It found the treating
58. E-mail from Robert Hoyer to Jacqueline Fox (July 2, 2002) (on file with
author).
59. Aetna Life & Casualty, Government-Wide Indemnity Benefit Plan:
United States Civil Service Commission (as revised January 1, 1966) (on file
with author).
60. As described by Robert Hoyer when asked about the difference between
the two paragraphs. See e-mail from Robert Hoyer to Jacqueline Fox (Mar. 3,
2003) (on file with author).
61. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Sanders, 193 S.E. 2d 173, 127 Ga. App. 352
(1972).
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physician's determination of this issue to be dispositive. To
quote from the opinion, "The operation in question was
recommended and approved by a physician attending the
Plaintiff, who determined that it was necessary for the
treatment62 of the disease concerned, as required by the
contract."
The courts at the time of the passage of the Medicare
Act were very likely to find that a medical treatment that
was recommended by a treating physician was
presumptively reasonably necessary because the treating
physician said it was. The inclusion in the Medicare Act of
language strictly prohibiting the government from
intruding in the physician/patient relationship 63 could
easily be read to encourage and support this judicial line of
reasoning and interpretation being applied to the Medicare
Act. Since 1965, this situation has dramatically changed in
the private sector. The typical health insurance policy now
has language that reserves to Aetna (and most other major
insurers) the right to be the sole interpreter of what
constitutes reasonably necessary (though the term often
used now is "medical necessity") and also has language that
states this in no way is meant to give an opinion on what is
the best medical treatment plan for a patient.
Medicare was drafted to quiet the concerns of those who
worried it would not provide high quality care to the
elderly, those who worried that physicians would refuse to
treat Medicare patients and those who worried that the
government would begin to control physicians' treatment
decisions. It did a fairly proficient job of calming these
worries and, almost immediately after implementation, cost
of these generously promised benefits became a constant
concern of those running the program.

III. CHANGES IN MEDICARE AND THE HEALTHCARE
MARKETPLACE GENERALLY SINCE 1965

Daniel Callahan, writing in the New England Journal
of Medicine in 1996, said "[w]e ought to be able to see
already that government-provided health care for the
elderly cannot remain what it has been in the latter part of
62. Id. at 356.
63.42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2005) ("Prohibition against any Federal interference").

596

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

the twentieth century-an
open-ended entitlement,
provided without regard to cost. Those days are gone
forever. '64 Callahan was writing about the projected
increases in the cost of the Medicare program, and whether
overt or covert rationing would be the best approach to
controlling cost. As this paper has shown, covert rationing
has been a part of Medicare's coverage decisions for some
time, but his point still stands.
This section describes the dramatic changes in the
health care arena since 1965 and how they impact on
Medicare and cost. The marketplace changes have been in
the areas of cost, market structure, legal issues and related
areas. There have also been substantial changes in the tools
we can use to improve a person's health. 65 What we have
the ability to do and what we choose to do are very different
and access to health care is a constant, pressing concern.
When Medicare began it quickly became clear that
there appeared to be no limit on what you could spend on
medical care.6 6 The original actuarial projections made in
1965 for the cost of providing Medicare's benefit package to
its members assumed the program would cost $3.1 billion in
1970. In 1967, the estimate was revised to $4.4 billion and
in 1969, it was revised to $5 billion. 67 Medicare has
continued to increase in cost. With the retirement of the
baby-boomer generation, the Medicare population is
expected to increase substantially, placing further financial
burdens on the system. 68
From 1966 to 1971, the goal of Medicare was
accommodation with American medicine. 69 Many parts of
the Medicare statute ended up having an inflationary
64. Daniel Callahan, Controlling the Costs of Health Care for the ElderlyFairMeans and Foul, 335 NEw ENG. J. MED. 744, 746 (1996).

65. See Lawrence 0. Gostin, Securing Health or Just Health Care? The
Effect of the Health Care System on the Health of America, 39 ST. Louis U. L.J.
7 (1994-95).
66. Milhorn Interview, supra note 17. See also COLLEEN M. FLOOD,
INTERNATIONAL HEALTH
ANALYSIS 55 (2000).

CARE REFORM: A LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL

67. S. REP. No. 91-1431, at 138 (1970).

68. See Powers, supra note 23, at 9.
69. Theodore R. Marmor & Gary J. McKissick, Medicare's Future: Fact,
Fictionand Folly, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 225, 230 (2000).
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impact on medical costs. "Reasonable" costs paid to
hospitals, "customary charges" paid to physicians, and the
consideration of depreciation and capital costs for
development of new medical infrastructure, all encouraged
the medical establishment to charge as much as it could
and develop as much as it could be reimbursed for. 70 Even
after these unintended inflationary reimbursement rules
were changed, costs have continued to rise. New technology
plays a significant role in increased costs. First, the new is
often more expensive than what came before. Second, the
new increases treatment options, meaning more things can
be done, and billed for, for a patient.
One interesting point is that there is tension between
the Food and Drug Administration (the "FDA") and
Medicare about new technology. The FDA is responsible for
determining if new medical technology is safe and effective.
Once the FDA has made a positive determination, CMS
faces significant pressure from device manufacturers to find
immediately the technology to be reasonable and necessary.
A complex battle has been underway for years among the
various stakeholders in this system to decide what impact
FDA approval should have on Medicare coverage
decisions.71
CMS has not been consistert about this problem. In
various communications to the regional carriers who make
the individual coverage decisions and in other public
documents, the language "safe and effective" has been used
variously as a synonym for "reasonable and necessary" and
as part of a definition of the same. 72 An example of this
confusion can be found in a notice published in the Federal
Register in 1987. CMS (then HCFA) stated that a coverage
assessment about an item or service would ascertain its
safety and effectiveness. 73 In the same publication, CMS
said current Medicare manuals provided for coverage of

70. Id. See also FLOOD, supra note 66, at 49.

71. Medicare Program; Procedures for Medical Services Coverage Decisions;
Request for Comments, 52 Fed. Reg. 15,560 (Apr. 29, 1987).
72. Id. For example, see Enclosure 2 to Intermediary Letters 77-4 and 77-5,
CCH MEDICARE AND MEDICAID GUIDE,

28,152, at 10,601 (1976). See also Evans,

supra note 7, at 428 (describing these criteria in HCFA publications).
73. Medicare Program; Procedures for Medical Services Coverage Decisions;
Request for Comments, 52 Fed. Reg. at 15,562.
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drugs and biologicals approved by the FDA unless it was
74
designated as not covered by a CMS national decision.
This would appear to reserve a right to CMS to come to a
contrary decision from the FDA. It would also appear that
the standard for their decision would be the same one the
FDA had just applied.
In another publication in the Federal Register, this one
from 1989, CMS said that historically, "reasonable and
necessary" had been translated into a test of "whether the
service in question is 'safe' and 'effective' and not
'experimental'," quoting from Intermediary Letters sent to
75
regional carriers as guidance for their coverage decisions.
FDA's positive determination only means that a
minimal amount of efficacy has been found. "Safe and
effective" does not set a standard for how effective, and does
not compare it to other available treatments. An approved
drug could be substantially less effective and less safe than
one currently on the market and still be approved. There is
room for difference in the two standards. If the two
processes were conflated, it would make the role of cost in
CMS decisions moot, since the FDA's would be the final
word.
A different issue concerns the private sector of health
care payers. Private, non-governmental health care payers
have undergone substantial structural changes that need to
be considered when making generalizations about what
needs to be done or what works in controlling health care
costs. Two federal laws passed in the early 1970s related to
this. The Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973
(the "HMO Act")76 and the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA")77 changed the relationship
between the payer and the patient. As described earlier,
insurance companies used to have a deferential approach to
physician decisions regarding patient care, as did courts.

74. Medicare Program; Procedures for Medical Services Coverage Decisions;
Request for Comments, 52 Fed. Reg. at 15,561.
75. Medicare Program; Criteria and Procedures for Making Medical Services
Coverage Decisions that Relate to Health Care Technology, 54 Fed. Reg. 4302,
4304 (Jan. 30, 1989) (quoting from Part A Intermediary Letter 77-4 and Part B
Intermediary Letter 77-5 (Jan. 1977)).
76. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e et seq. (2004).
77. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. (2004).
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Perhaps in part due to this deference, care costs increased.
With the steady and expensive surge in care, payers looked
for ways to reign in utilization of health care services.
These two laws made that easier. The HMO Act "allowed
the formation of HMOs that assume financial risks for the
provision of health care services."78 A key aspect of HMOs is
that "there must be rationing and an inducement to ration"
to function properly. 79 Contracts between HMOs and their
physician employees offer incentives to ensure limited
utilization of expensive procedures.
The second law, ERISA, was written in large part to
protect employees' pensions and other benefits from
unethical employers. It imposes a limited fiduciary
obligation on employers in their role as protectors or
managers of benefits, including pension funds. Employees
have a right to sue employers under ERISA in federal court
for benefits they are being denied, such as disability or
pension funds. They can receive attorney's fees and the
benefit being sought.8 0 Most state laws that regulate ERISA
benefits are preempted by the federal law and regulations,
as are state causes of action against employers for their
actions regarding ERISA benefits. 8 ' Health benefits
provided by employers are included under ERISA.
The preemption of state law and the limits of recovery
under a federal ERISA action shifted the financial risk for
health care payers. Plaintiffs cannot recover damages for
any harm caused by a denial of benefits in an ERISA plan.
At most they can recover the cost of the denied benefit.
A classic example of the ERISA preemption at work is
the case of Florence Corcoran.8 2 Corcoran was a pregnant
woman in Louisiana in 1989. She received health benefits
through her employer. Near her delivery date, her doctor
ordered her hospitalization in order to provide twenty-four
hour monitoring for her distressed fetus. Coverage for this
was denied and instead she was approved for ten hours of
daily monitoring at home. She accepted the ten hours of

78. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 233 (2000).
79. Id. at 221.
80. 29 U.S.C. § 1001.
81. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
82. Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
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monitoring. The fetus then died during the other fourteen
hours of the day. Corcoran's earlier pregnancy required the
exact same monitoring; she was hospitalized that time and
the baby was delivered by emergency caesarian section
after suffering fetal distress. That baby survived.
These facts appear to assert a straightforward claim for
liability against the payer, but for ERISA. The court in
Corcoran interpreted the ERISA preemption broadly, as the
Supreme Court had instructed in an ERISA case from 1990
that said, "[t]he preemption clause is conspicuous for its
"[t]he
conceded
Corcoran court
The
breadth. '8 3
acknowledged absence of a remedy under ERISA's civil
enforcement scheme for medical malpractice committed in
connection with a plan benefit determination. 8' 4 Absent
Congressional action, the absence of a remedy remains. For
a payer in an ERISA plan and/or an HMO, the financial
risk of denying coverage is often less than the financial risk
of paying for a treatment. While CMS is also not vulnerable
to malpractice suits for its decisions, there are differences
between Medicare and non-governmental payers that make
this type of risk assessment practical for private sector
payers and not for CMS.
When care is denied, there is a risk that a problem
might develop as a result of the denied care that would
prove to be more expense to treat, resulting in a net loss for
the insurer. One risk that needs to be balanced, then, is the
eventual cost of foregoing needed medical care. Nongovernmental payers rarely have to shoulder this for two
reasons. First, there is a constant migration of members
among different health care plans. It would be rare for a
person to have one company's coverage throughout his or
her working life.8 5 Second, due to the existence of Medicare,
these payers do not have to bear the risk of problems that
arise in later life. At age sixty-five, their member
population will leave them, taking along any possible8 6costs
of their increased ill health due to earlier denied care.

83. FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 58 (1990).
84. 965 F.2d at 1333.
85. See Madison Powers, Managed Care: How Economic Incentive Reforms
Went Wrong, KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 353, 355-57 (1997).
86. Id. at 358-59.
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The long-term benefits of interventions are not realized
predictably by non-government payers. The benefits of early
interventions that impact the quality of later life accrue to
Medicare, not to the company paying for them. These
interventions are a poor investment from the perspective of
an organization's assessment of its expected risks and
benefits. The benefits of intervention that might become
clear in a decade are also not necessarily going to accrue to
the non-government payer.
For payers who are for-profit corporations whose stock
is publicly traded, the risk-benefit analysis is even further
removed from Medicare's. Quarterly reports, required to be
filed under securities laws, need to list salient details about
cash reserves and other numbers indicative of a company's
financial performance. These reports often have a direct
impact on stock market values of a company's shares. This
creates an entirely different incentive structure for these
corporations, as they need to gage the impact of payments
and denials on their quarterly reports. This creates a
motive to deny coverage of an expensive procedure late in a
quarter in order to increase the cash on hand, while the
same procedure might be approved at a better time in the
fiscal year.
The point of these comparisons between Medicare and
non-government plans is not to condemn either side. The
point is, rather, that techniques used by these payers are
not readily transferable to the Medicare system. The riskbenefit analysis is different and needs to be taken into
account when assessing the usefulness of a given scheme.
Managed care is a structure for providing health care
where an insurer "attempts to influence the cost, volume,
and quality of health services supplied and/or recommended
by health care providers. '8 7 As managed care flooded the
American marketplace in the 1990s, there appeared to be
great cost-saving benefits. The rate of medical inflation
slowed from 1990-1995, but then began to rise again.88 At
the same time, the public reacted strongly against the more
draconian limits of managed care. During the late 1990s,
numerous bills were introduced in Congress to prohibit
insurance companies from making specific types of
87. FLOOD, supranote 66, at 8.
88. Id. at 59.
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denials.8 9 Mandatory
coverage
for two
days of
hospitalization for a mother after a vaginal delivery was
put in place after some HMOs were reported to have been
sending mothers home within eight hours of giving birth.
Mandatory coverage for breast reconstruction after
mastectomy was another example of a federal limit on
trends in managed care.
There has been a retreat away from managed care in
the first half of this decade. The Federal Department of
Labor created regulations under ERISA that have given
plan members significant powers to appeal denials in a
timely and effective manner. Consumers are reported to
have
gotten increasingly
sophisticated
about
the
importance of appeals in health care determinations. All of
this increases the already high costs of administering
managed care plans.
Medicare has also had an impact on changes in the nongovernment payer arena. Generally, other payers follow
CMS's coverage decisions. If a procedure or technology is
paid for by Medicare, or denied by Medicare, that usually
represents the final word for non-governmental payers in
the country. 90 The importance of CMS coverage decisions is
hard to exaggerate, as they have the de facto power to deny
access to most Americans. Thus the criteria used to make
these decisions resonate beyond the Medicare population,
making it immediately relevant to everyone else. Was
Medicare to deny coverage of an effective new technology
due in large part to its cost, that same denial, judging by
past patterns, would most likely result in members of forprofit insurance plans being denied access to the same, no
matter how much they pay for coverage. In other words,
due to the influence of CMS coverage decisions on other
insurers, there is a risk of cost-based rationing being
implemented across the entire American population with no
or limited benefit to the overall population.
An example of CMS-influenced rationing of health care
happened in the heart transplant case described earlier in
this article. Medicare took a long time to develop coverage
criteria. During that time, non-governmental payers began
to cover heart transplants with generous benefits. Once
89. Id.
90. Evans, supranote 7, at 438.
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Medicare implemented its criteria, that criteria became the
standard applied by other payers. A hospital's transplant
center that was not certified by Medicare to perform heart
transplants was highly unlikely to be reimbursed by any
other payer for performing a heart transplant on one of
their beneficiaries. The cost criteria hidden within
Medicare's decision controlled much of the country's access
to heart transplants. 91
IV. CONGRESSIONAL ATTEMPTS TO CONTROL MEDICARE COSTS
The issue facing Medicare is whether it may consider
cost in making coverage decisions, absent any direct
guidance from Congress. Given the increase in Medicare's
cost since the program's inception, it is important to
consider what Congress has already done about it and why
it hasn't given CMS explicit guidance about cost.
This section examines different legislative proposals in
an effort both to explicate the dynamics of this issue and to
show more broadly what Congress has done here. An overriding principle to keep in mind while considering this is in
a quote from a former long-term CMS employee: "The third
politics was limiting necessary care. Touch
rail of Medicare
it and die."'92
The first Congressional action examined here is a
Senate Finance Committee Report on Medicare costs from
1970 (the "Finance Committee"). 93 This report proposed
legislation to control Medicare costs. The proposed
legislation is then compared with the enacted legislation to
see which cost controls were politically palatable at that
time. The second concerns legislation proposed by President
Carter for the purpose of limiting the inflation rate of
hospital costs. Congress reacted vehemently against this.
The third is the prospective payment legislation that was
passed in the 1980s.

91. See M.F. Baldwin, Heart Transplant Centers Must Meet Volume Criteria,
Nov. 7, 1986, at 36-37 (discussion about implementation
of Medicare's coverage criteria).
MODERN HEALTHCARE,

92. Milhorn Interview, supra note 17.

93. STAFF OF SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE, REPORT ON MEDICARE PROBLEMS,
S. REP. No. 91-1431, at 46 (1970).
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In 1970, the Senate Finance Committee released a
report on Medicare costs. The report was based on
information gathered during extensive hearings on this
issue conducted by the Senate Subcommittee on Medicare
and Medicaid. In the report, the increase in Medicare costs
was attributed to two problems. The first was the cost of
each separate unit of covered care. The second was the
increase in the number of services provided to members of
Medicare. The Finance Committee observed that as
Medicare was then structured, there was little incentive for
providers to contain costs or to produce services in the most
efficient or effective manner. 94 To fix this, the Finance
Committee proposed a prospective payment system, with
rates set in advance of treatment.
The second problem was approached differently. The
concern was caused by a number of witnesses who "testified
that a significant number of the health services provided
under Medicare . . . are in excess of those which would be
found medically necessary. '95 The unnecessary .care was
considered problematic both because of its cost and its
predictable negative effect on those receiving it.
The report based all of its recommendations on the
underlying premise that to rid the system of care that was
not necessary would solve the financial problem of
Medicare's increasing cost. In fact, studies have since
shown that increased utilization, by itself, has "played a
small role in driving up Medicare's costs. '96 Nevertheless,
at the time, the recommendation was for a much more
rigorous utilization review process and for a restructuring
of Medicare to make it more closely resemble HMOs then
popular in California. As discussed earlier in this paper, it
is now commonly accepted that one principle reason for
having increased management of care, including with
HMOs, is to ration care, but that was not expressly stated
by the Senate Finance Committee.
To increase the effectiveness of utilization review, the
Senate Finance Committee proposed the creation of
Professional Standards Review Organizations ("PSROs").

94. Id. at 118.
95. Id. at 150.
96. MARMOR, supra note 20, at 108 (citation omitted).
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Ideally, these groups would develop adequate regional
norms of care and would apply them in assessing utilization
in individual circumstances. PSROs would determine
medical necessity of a treatment and would encourage the
use of least costly treatments and least costly sites for care
for a particular patient. 97 PSROs would review provider
records to see where patterns of inappropriate care were
occurring. The success of PSROs would be based, in some
part, on whether their denial rates were as high as other
PSROs. PSROs would be vulnerable to financial penalties if
they were not maintaining adequate denial rates. 98 Under
this proposal, physicians who treated Medicare patients
could be liable for varying degrees of sanctions for routinely
exceeding the PSRO norms of care. There was also a
proposal for a demonstration project where a PSRO would
underwrite all care for the Medicare population in its
geographic area. It would be paid on a capitated basis. That
is, it would be paid a set amount per person to provide all
necessary care.
The goal of all of these proposals was to create an
environment where "physicians involved would have
economic incentives to practice efficiently and effectively." 99
The merits of different parts of this proposal can be
argued with substantial merits on either side. The point
here, however, is to compare this proposal with what
became the actual PSRO law. 100 The PSRO law gave PSROs
responsibility for determining medical necessity of care.
This included determining whether the care could be given
in a less expensive environment.10 1 It did not include the
power to determine whether there was a less expensive
treatment available, as had been proposed by the Senate
Finance Committee. The PSROs had no financial incentives
to deny care and had no role in determining norms of care.
They were given an additional role not envisioned by the
Senate Finance Committee, which was to ensure the

97. S. REP. No. 91-1431, at 157.

98. Id.
99. Id. at 164.
100. Professional Standards Review, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329,
1429-30 (1972) (amending Title XI, § 1151 of the Social Security Act).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3(a)(1)(A) and (C) (2005).
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met "professionally
quality of care provided to beneficiaries
'10 2
recognized standards of health care.
The proposed demonstration project did not occur. 10The
3 It
PSRO law, as finally enacted, did not result in savings.
is not clear from the legislative history what led to the
changes from the proposed law to the one that passed, but
it isn't hard to guess what the concerns of Congress were.
The pressure on Congress to stay away from certain
forms of health care reform is illustrated in an event from
the Carter presidency in the late 1970s. According to the
Congressional Research Service, from the period of 1950 to
1978, health care costs in the United States had increased
eleven fold, had increased four fold since 1963, and had
doubled since 1972.104
President Carter assessed the health care system as a
failure on many levels. In his book Keeping Faith,published
in 1982, he described it this way: "Although American
medical skill is among the best in the world, we have an
abominable system in this country for the delivery of health
care, with gross inequities . . . and profiteering by many
"...
105 His analysis was that the system created
hospitals .
numerous inefficiencies, particularly in the area of
and
underutilized
facilities
hospital
unnecessary
equipment. 106 In fact, the breadth of Medicare benefits and
the "reasonable cost" reimbursements had combined to
eliminate price competition to control hospital costs,
causing inflation. 0 7 In 1977 the Carter Administration
proposed guidelines for the purpose of eliminating the
underused beds and facilities. This proposal "set off an

102. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3(a)(1)(B).
103. See Stuart H. Altman & Harvey M. Sapolsky, Preface, in FEDERAL
HEALTH PROGRAMS: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS at vii, xiv (Stuart H. Altman &
Harvey M. Sapolsky, eds., 1981). See also David E. Berman & Paul M.
Gertman, Cost Containment and Quality Assurance: The Potential and
Performance of the Professional Standard Review Organization Program, in
FEDERAL HEALTH PROGRAMS, supra, at 42.
104. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., supra note 49, at 47.

105. JIMMY CARTER, KEEPING FAITH 85 (1982).
106. Id.
107. Stephen M. Weiner, Paying for Hospital Services under Medicare: Can
We Control Hospital Costs?, in FEDERAL HEALTH PROGRAMS, supra note 103, at
135, 137-39.
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avalanche of protests." 10 8 The protest letters sent to
Congress had a substantial impact. These letters were
apparently orchestrated by the hospital industry, but still
reflected enough public concern to be effective.
In 1979, Carter proposed a hospital cost containment
bill.109 It suffered a resounding defeat. The rhetoric in
Congress was sharp, including by prominent Democrats,
those in the President's own party. Industry executives and
physicians testified that Carter's plan would lead to
rationing and would inhibit the development of life-saving
technology. During the House debates, Representative Phil
Gramm (then a Democrat from Texas) said "[p]eople are
going to die" if the bill was enacted. According to the
Congressional Quarterly, this "touched perhaps on the most
controversial, underlying issue."1 10 Carter, observing gross
inequities and inefficiencies, wanted to increase access to
health care. He proposed legislation to accomplish some of
this and did not succeed due to the perception that he was
taking access away from the people, threatening both their
lives and the future of American medicine. Clearly, he had
trod upon dangerous ground in American politics.
In 1983, Congress created a prospective payment
system. n An independent commission was established as
part of this system. The Commission, known as the
Prospective Payment Assessment Commission, was given
the explicit authority to consider and assess safety, efficacy
and cost-effectiveness of new and currently in use medical
procedures and technology. This was to be done as part of
making recommendations as to how much should be paid
for various procedures. 112 The prospective payment system
is not a part of a medical necessity decision-making process.
Instead, Congress created a two-step approach still in effect
today. The first step is coverage, determining whether

108. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., supra note 49, at 47.

109. H.R. 2626, 96th Cong. (1979).
110. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., PRESIDENT CARTER: 1979 75 (1980)

(rejection by House of Representatives of President Carter's Hospital Control
Plan).
111. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65
(1983).
112. Institute

of Medicine,

The

Scope of

Assessment, 2 ASSESSING MED. TECH. 42 (1985).

U.S. Medical Technology
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something is reasonable and necessary. The second step is
to determine the reimbursement rate, that is, how much
Medicare will pay for the care to be provided to patients.
A focus on reducing costs by challenging provider
reimbursement is a safer political tack to take." 3 There is
still a risk of patients arguing that payment can cause a
reduction in care, but it is a more attenuated argument to
make. The program was based on diagnosis-related groups
("DRGs"). Medicare would pay fixed rates based on the
diagnosis rather than on what actually occurred in the
treatment of a specific patient. 114 This type of payment
method was first used for hospitals and was extended to
physician services in 1989. It was couched in "technocratic
garb" to "keep disputes over cost control out of the political
process."115
In effect, DRGs put a cap on treatment costs for a
specific diagnosis putting pressure on the provider to use
resources efficiently. This shift to a two-part system
(coverage then cost) with CMS exerting tremendous control
over what the cost would be introduced what could be
16
considered a "new regulatory regime" into Medicare."
From 1985 to 1990, Medicare's share of national hospital
expenditures was reduced by 2.8% and Medicare expenses
per member grew more slowly than private insurers during
the same time period.1 17 This would imply some success,
and of course one cannot know what would have happened
in the absence of this program's enactment.
There have been other proposals debated. One, the
disastrous Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988
("MCCA") was passed and repealed in the time between the
passage of the prospective payment system for hospitals
and the one for physician services. This Act greatly
expanded Medicare's coverage, with added benefits for
prescription drugs and preventive care. It did not cover
extended nursing home stays. It also incorporated a higher
Part B premium for those with greater wealth, introducing

113. See generally FEDERAL HEALTH PROGRAMS, supra note 103.
114. MARMOR, supra note 20, at 109.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 108.
117. Id. at 110.
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a progressive payment structure not seen in Medicare
before. MCCA was reviled by organizations representing
and the law was repealed within two years of its
the elderly
18
passage.1
Congress has tried different approaches to controlling
Medicare's cost. The prospective payment system appears
to be the most politically acceptable so far. The new
and
Improvement,
Drug,
Prescription
Medicare
Modernization Act of 20031 9 has yet to be fully
implemented. It remains to be seen how acceptable it will
be to the vocal and active Medicare population. The law is
lengthy and complex, making it difficult to gauge its
societal impact in advance.
V. WHAT CMS WANTS: THE SPECIFIC ROLE OF COST

What does CMS want? In determining the proper role
of cost in CMS coverage decisions, CMS's concerns and
priorities in this area are relevant. This section examines
CMS's proposed criteria for making coverage decisions and
criticisms this process has generated. It also highlightes
some problems with concepts CMS has embraced in
furtherance of its goals.
A good starting point is the published proposed criteria
for making national coverage decisions. These were done in
three different publications in the Federal Register. The
first proposed rule was published in 1989. The stated issue
was to establish criteria and procedures for CMS (then
HCFA) decisions about which health care technologies could
be considered reasonable and necessary. 120 The rule was
published after implementation of the prospective payment
system and makes it expressly clear that these decisions
would determine coverage, as opposed to payment for
services. Coverage comes first in the two-step process. The
proposed rule puts cost up front by making costeffectiveness the first explicitly listed criteria for coverage

118. Id. at 112.

119. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003).
120. Medicare Program; Criteria and Procedures for Making Medical
Services Coverage Decisions that Relate to Health Care Technology, 54 Fed.
Reg. 4302 (Jan. 30, 1989).
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decisions. In fact, cost-effectiveness is the only criteria
described in the first section of the publication.
In this publication, CMS gives cost as one of the three
reasons for considering an issue for a possible national
coverage decision. "Health and safety concerns" is another,
and the third, possible over-utilization or abuse, is in some
regards a combination of the first two. It certainly has a
large cost-conscious component. 121 The regulation then lists
eight criteria considered by HCFA in determining if a
national coverage decision should be made. Any one of these
eight is sufficient, by itself. Number four is "the service is
likely to represent a significant expense to the Medicare
program." 122
It is noteworthy that in the proposed regulation, CMS's
historical description of its national coverage decisionmaking process appears to be inaccurate. Part one of this
paper describes a process regarding coverage of heart
transplants that was motivated and shaped by cost
concerns. These concerns were straightforward: that heart
transplants could prove to be so expensive as to strain the
resources of the Medicare program. Yet in this proposed
regulation written years after this coverage decision had
been made, CMS states that safety, efficacy, and common
acceptance by the medical community have been the
fundamental tests for coverage. In fact, it seeks to change
the criteria to allow consideration of cost.1 23 In a more
detailed description later in the proposed regulation of the
criteria then in use for national coverage
decisions, neither
cost nor cost-effectiveness is mentioned. 124
The publication does propose to expressly add costeffectiveness to the coverage criteria and gives detailed
121. Medicare
Services Coverage
Reg. at 4305.
122. Medicare
Services Coverage
Reg. at 4305.
123. Medicare
Services Coverage
Reg. at 4305-06.
124. Medicare
Services Coverage
Reg. at 4307-08.

Program; Criteria and Procedures for Making Medical
Decisions that Relate to Health Care Technology, 54 Fed.
Program; Criteria and Procedures for Making Medical
Decisions that Relate to Health Care Technology, 54 Fed.
Program; Criteria and Procedures for Making Medical
Decisions that Relate to Health Care Technology, 54 Fed.
Program; Criteria and Procedures for Making Medical
Decisions that Relate to Health Care Technology, 54 Fed.
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descriptions of both its meaning and proposed use. It also
attempts to distinguish cost-effectiveness in the coverage
area from the use of cost-effectiveness in the payment area.
This distinction is critically important when analyzing this
issue. Medicare has long directed the regional carriers to
consider cost-effectiveness in payment decisions. If a new
technology has the same effectiveness but at a greater cost,
carriers have been told to approve reimbursement for both
technologies at the less expensive one's rate. This is
described in the proposed regulation. 125 The directions to
the carriers can be found in the coverage manuals under
most
the descriptive term "least costly alternative" and are 126
commonly considered with durable medical equipment.
The use of the term cost-effectiveness as it is applied to
carriers is an appropriate one. A standard definition of a
cost-effective technology is "one that is as effective as an
alternative but less expensive."' 27 If no alternative
technology exists, any effectiveness is cost-effective. There
are two problems with the coverage cost-effective analysis
as proposed in the publication. The criteria of the costeffective analysis CMS was proposing to make as part of a
coverage decision is very broad and might appear to be
more of a "cost-benefit" analysis, which is quite different.
CMS proposed to consider elements that are far beyond the
standard scope of "effectiveness" of medical treatment.
These include indirect costs or savings such as increased
productivity of the disabled and various transportation
costs. These would be given a monetary value for purposes
of the coverage decision evaluation.
A cost-benefit analysis seeks to determine if the cost of
paying for something is worth the benefit to society based
on the society's valuation of both the benefit and the cost. It
is often determined by aggregating individual preferences
125. Medicare Program; Criteria and Procedures for Making Medical
Services Coverage Decisions that Relate to Health Care Technology, 54 Fed.
Reg. at 4308-09.
126. See Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Medicare Program
Integrity Manual, Pub. 24, ch. 13 § 5.4 (Apr. 5, 2002); Medicare Carrier's
Manual, Pub. 1790, ch. II § 2100.2 A-C (Feb. 21, 2003).
127. Paul E. Kalb, M.D., Controlling Health Care Costs by Controlling
Technology: A Private ContractualApproach, 99 YALE L.J. 1109, 1112 (1990)

(citing Doubilet, Weinstein & McNeil, Use and Misuse of the Term "Cost
Effective" in Medicine, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 253, 254 (1986)).
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into a ranking or scale. It is very problematic and
particularly so for health care, where people's preferences
tend to change dramatically when they become ill.128 It can
end up working to entrench preferences that are
prejudicial, ill considered, or irrational. It can also be based
on mistaken assessments as to what is most beneficial to a
society or a sub-group (such as the "disabled").
However, whether the criteria given in the proposed
regulation for cost-effectiveness fully fit within a definition
of a cost-benefit analysis or not, the problem remains
essentially the same. CMS wanders onto thin ice when it
seeks to broadly assess the societal worth of financing a
medical technology. Instead of sticking to the focused task
of assessing relative health benefits per unit of expended
resources, including
indirect
non-health
benefits
fundamentally alters the nature of CMS's role in making
health coverage decisions. The more it seeks to have costeffectiveness accomplish, the more they risk confrontation
over their decisions.
The second problem is completely different from the
first. If CMS uses the standard meaning of costeffectiveness, this consideration does not appear to
accomplish anything in addition to what is already
accomplished by considering cost-effectiveness in the
payment step. A cost-effective, viciously expensive new
technology would still threaten the financial security of
Medicare. This problem is what needs to be addressed more
directly by a system such as the one proposed in the
introduction to this article. In terms of where the right to
consider cost comes from, in section III.C. of the proposed
regulation CMS explains that it believes cost is a part of the
"reasonable" determination and should now be considered
due to the "current explosion of high-cost medical
technologies." 129 This proposed regulation generated tens of
thousands of negative comments. 1 0 The majority of them

128. See generally HENRY S. RICHARDSON, DEMOCRATIC AUTONOMY: PUBLIC
REASONING ABOUT THE ENDS OF POLICY 119-29 (2002).

129. Medicare Program; Criteria and Procedures for Making Medical
Services Coverage Decisions that Relate to Health Care Technology, 54 Fed.
Reg.at 4308-09.
130. Milhorn Interview, supra note 17.
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disagreed with CMS as to 31
the permissibility of considering
decisions.1
coverage
in
cost
No further action was taken on this issue until April 27,
1999, ten years later, when CMS published a general
notice. The notice announced the process to be used in
making national coverage decisions and formally withdrew
the 1989 proposed regulation. 132 The general notice
described a new approach to national coverage decisions.
Congress had recently passed a law allowing these
decisions to be made without CMS engaging in notice and
comment rulemaking procedures,1 33 generally required for
agencies under the Administrative
Procedure Act
("APA"). 134 National coverage decisions are made under 42
U.S.C. 1395y(l) of the Medicare Act and are binding on the
entire Medicare program. Congress also acted to make
these decisions unreviewable by administrative law judges,
1 35
who otherwise do review appeals of Medicare denials.
The notice drew attention to these rules.
The description of how national coverage decisions
would be made did not mention cost. There were some
terms, not further defined, that could have within them a
role for cost, such as issues involving "broad health policy
concerns" 136 or ones that have "the potential to have a
major impact on the Medicare program,"1 37 but any specific
criteria for national coverage decisions was entirely absent.
On May 16, 2000, CMS published a "Notice of intent to
publish a proposed rule" in the Federal Register.138 The
stated intent was to solicit comments in advance on criteria

131. Id.
132. Medicare Program; Procedures for
Decisions, 64 Fed. Reg. 22,619 (Apr. 27, 1999).

Making

National

Coverage

133. 42 U.S.C. § 1395hh(a)(2) (2005); § 1395ff(f)(1)(A) (2005).
134. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2005).
135. Federal Health Insurance for the Aged and Disabled, 42 C.F.R. §§
405.732, 405.860 (2005).

136. Medicare Program; Procedures
Decisions, 64 Fed. Reg. at 22,623.

for

Making

National

Coverage

137. Medicare Program; Procedures
Decisions, 64 Fed. Reg. at 22,623.

for

Making

National

Coverage

138. Medicare Program; Criteria for Making Coverage Decisions, 65 Fed.
Reg. 31,124 (May 16, 2000).
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to be used in making Medicare coverage decisions. The
publication quotes from the legislative history of the
Medicare Act, saying one of the goals of Medicare from the
beginning was to make "the best of modern medicine"
available to the beneficiaries. 139 It then said that Congress
had two strong interests it expected CMS to pursue. The
first is providing access to necessary medical care for
Medicare beneficiaries and the second is ensuring the sound
financial basis of the Medicare program. 140 The publication
then describes the specific scope of coverage created by
Congress in the Medicare Act, including the reasonable and
necessary language, in close proximity to their explication
of the "sound financial basis" prong of CMS's duties under
the Medicare Act. 141 It implies that the job of a reasonable
and necessary determination is to protect Medicare's
financial well-being. This analysis is not stated explicitly in
the publication but it does offer some basis for CMS's
opinion that cost would be allowable under the reasonable
and necessary language.
The notice of intent proposed that national coverage
decisions would allow coverage if the item or service showed
demonstrable medical benefit and presented an "added
value" to the Medicare population. 142 The "added value"
analysis presented in the publication tracked a narrow costeffectiveness analysis. The difference between this and the
payment approach to cost-effectiveness is that if an item or
service is not cost-effective and Medicare already covers a
cost-effective alternative, the new item or service will be
than being covered at the other item
denied coverage rather
1 43
cost.
service's
or
There is always a worry about industry's role in this
debate. Device and pharmaceutical manufacturers have

139. Medicare Program; Criteria for Making Coverage Decisions, 65 Fed.
Reg. at 31,126.
140. Medicare Program; Criteria for Making Coverage Decisions, 65 Fed.
Reg. at 31,126.
141. Medicare Program; Criteria for Making Coverage Decisions, 65 Fed.
Reg. at 31,126.
142. Medicare Program; Criteria for Making Coverage Decisions, 65 Fed.
Reg. at 31,127.
143. Medicare Program; Criteria for Making Coverage Decisions, 65 Fed.
Reg. at 31,127.
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enormous financial risks when coverage decisions are being
made. They have the ability to provoke patient responses to
Medicare decisions. If Medicare decides coverage, this will
often control the dissemination of the technology around the
country. Some commentators see this and argue that the
economic benefits of the medical device and pharmaceutical
industries are sufficiently important to merit protection in
the CMS coverage process. 144 Whether one agrees with the
importance of protecting industry or not, the role of
industry raises a concern that is common in agency law.
The problem is explained in public choice theory. When
powerful interests take over the process to ensure their own
financial gain, according to this theory, it is a plundering of
the democratic process. 145 With an industry as powerful as
the pharmaceutical and device industry, that needs to be a
concern in terms of CMS's ability to resist the pressures
brought to bear on them. Susan Bartlett Foote believes that
this type of industry capture of agency action has been
of CMS to promulgate cost-effectiveness
behind the failure
146
regulations.
The requirement of a proven medical benefit for
coverage is actually problematic on its own. Critics of costeffectiveness analysis and, more broadly, of other forms of
outcomes research, are keenly aware of the risks to
individuals inherent in both cost consideration and efficacy
studies. Hilde Lindermann Nelson has pointed out the
normative decision inherent in defining a "good outcome."
She uses theories about what real knowledge consists of to
show it reflects one's individual perspective and is often
socially situated. 147 Patients tend to have lower status than
physicians in terms of the authority acceded to their type of

144. See Eleanor D. Kinney, Medicare Coverage Decision: Making and
Appeal Procedures: Can Process Meet the Challenge of New Medical
Technology?, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1461 (2003).
145. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Structuring Lawmaking to
Reduce Cognitive Bias: A Critical View, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 616, 616 (2002).
146. See generally Susan Bartlett Foote, Why Medicare Cannot Promulgate
a National Coverage Rule: A Case of Regula Mortis, 27 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y &
L. 707 (2002).
147. Hilde Lindemann Nelson, Knowledge at the Bedside: A Feminist View
of What's Happening with This Patient, in MEANING AND MEDICINE: A READER IN
THE PHILOSOPHY OF HEALTH CARE

theory of knowledge).

106, 110 (1999) (interpreting Wittgenstein's

616

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

knowing.
Physicians tend to be considered "in a position to
48
know."1
In the ideal physician/patient interaction, both parties
work together to achieve a treatment plan that respects a
patient's autonomy and moves towards an outcome that will
be perceived by all participants as a cure. Some knowledge
that can come from the patient includes which abilities are
necessary for their daily lives, what experiences will respect
their bodily experience and other intensely personal parts
of the presenting condition of the patient and the patient's
actual illness. 149 This role for the patient, and the respect it
entails for what the patient knows, is difficult to promote
and is not terribly vigorous.
One problem with outcomes research, including costefficiency analysis, is that it minimizes the role of the
individual patient's input. To hold physicians to treatment
plans developed without an individual patient's input has a
cost for the physician-patient relationship and may not
result in the optimal end-result from the patient's
perspective. At its best, "the outcomes movement promises
to make health care more effective by [basing clinical
decisions on] statistical analysis of large data bases.' 5 °
Impersonal knowledge of outcome probabilities is151given
greater weight than a physician's clinical experience.
There are costs when physician choices are dictated by
statistical generalities. For example, a study typically
determines that a therapy works in X% of cases. If X is high
enough, or if no alternative to the therapy exists, it is likely
X will become the accepted treatment. If X is low, it may
not be effective in a high enough percentage of cases to
merit inclusion in treatment paradigms. The patients
represented by the small value of X will not, in the future,
get the therapy, even though it was effective in their cases.
The greater the number of clinical decisions based on
outcomes studies that contained an unacceptably low
efficacy, the greater the number of patients who will be

148. Id.

149. See id. at 114.
150. Sandra J. Tanenbaum, What Physicians Know, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED.

1268, 1268 (1993).
151. See id. at 1269.
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predictably deprived of care
that would have been effective
15 2
in their individual cases.
After publication of the 2000 notice, no subsequent rule
has been published. However, as described earlier in this
article, Congress has recently passed a law which directed
the Secretary of Health and Human Services to "make
available to the public the factors considered in making
national coverage determinations of whether an item or
service is reasonable and necessary." 153 No guidance as to
what those factors should be was included, a waste of an
opportunity to clarify what role cost, cost-effectiveness, or
cost-benefit analysis should play.
Were CMS to expressly use cost in any form as grounds
for denying national coverage of a medical technology, it is
likely that a court would eventually analyze both the
Medicare Act and the regulations interpreting it to
determine the propriety of CMS's criteria. 154 The theory and
the criteria would, presumably, have some impact on a
court's ruling. Sean Tunis, the current director of CMS's
Office of Clinical Standards and Quality, is effectively the
head of national coverage decisions. In an editorial he
recently wrote for the New England Journal of Medicine
discussing the problems in developing criteria for coverage
decisions, he singled out the role of cost-effectiveness
analysis as one of the most difficult policy issues. To quote,
"[T]he use of economic analyses will be challenging to
defend whenever a specific patient is denied care as a result
...
[wihether coverage decisions and other Medicare policy
factors remains
decisions should be influenced by economic
' 155
an important and controversial issue.'

152. See also David M. Frankford, Food Allergy and The Health Care
FinancingAdministration: A Story of Rage, 1 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 159 (1996)

(describing problems such as manipulation of data for political or financial goals
and other risks with outcome studies).
153. See § 731, 117 Stat. at 2349.
154. Due to the complexity of the laws governing appeals and review of
national coverage decisions, among other things, actually getting this issue
before a federal judge requires running a legal obstacle course that is beyond
the scope of this paper to analyze. For example, see Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S.
602 (1984) where exhaustion of internal appeals of a Medicare national
coverage decision was required before a case was deemed ripe for judicial
review. For purposes of this paper, it will be presumed that it can be done.
155.

Sean R. Tunis, M.D., Why Medicare Has Not Established Criteriafor
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It seems fair to presume from the conclusion of this
editorial that what Dr. Tunis wants is a "robust and
acceptable approach to evaluating costs in decisions about
coverage and payment [to] .. . increase the likelihood that
total healthcare benefit
patients will receive the greatest
156
spending."'
Medicare
from...
Perhaps the question before a judge would be as
follows: Given the change in the cost of the Medicare
program and in medical technology generally, has costeffectiveness become an essential part of deciding what is
reasonable and necessary for Medicare to cover? Medicare's
retreat from an expansive to a more traditional definition of
cost-effectiveness in its various publications could,
arguably, allow the most recent definition to stand as the
one it would pursue.
However, what Dr. Tunis concludes in his editorial,
coupled with other remarks made by earlier CMS decision
makers, could imply that CMS wants, or believes it needs,
more than cost-effectiveness can give. This question,
supported by the heart transplant decision, is as follows:
May CMS deny coverage of medical technology because it
simply costs too much, even if the technology would be
beneficial to individual patients?
VI. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION OF "REASONABLE AND
NECESSARY"

This section looks at the role of cost in the "reasonable
and necessary" language of the Medicare Act from the
perspective of the court system. This is a three-part
analysis. The first examines court opinions that address
this specific language. The second examines the impact of
the relationship between agencies and Congress in
Supreme Court opinions and related literature, as well as
considering traditional methods of statutory interpretation.
The third section discusses whether CMS is qualified to
make the choices that are inherent in cost considerations,

Coverage Decisions, 350 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 2196, 2197 (2004).
156. Id. at 2198. Dr. Tunis was given access to the research conducted for
this article and based his assertions that the reasonable and necessary
language was taken from an Aetna policy on that research. See id. at 2197.

2005]

LEGAL IMPEDIMENTS

619

in terms of its status as an agency of the executive branch
of the federal government, as compared to Congress.
There are no court opinions that have specifically
addressed the issue of cost as a criterion for Medicare
national coverage decisions. Some decisions have addressed
the scope of "reasonable and necessary" decisions made by
Medicare under the Medicare Act. 157 In Goodman v.
Sullivan, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
"reasonable and necessary" standard did not require
1 58
Medicare to cover all necessary services for beneficiaries.
This holding was important to Medicare because it clarified
that Medicare was not subject to a rule that found the
opposite for Medicaid beneficiaries. 159 No specific definition
of necessary was given in the case. The court seemed to
base its reasoning on the existence of limits within the
Medicare statute beyond the requirement that care be
reasonable and necessary, such as the exclusion from
coverage for experimental treatment. 160 Given these other
limits that limited coverage prior to a reasonable and
necessary determination, all necessary care could not be
presumed covered.
Some of the strongest language about resource
allocation is in Lerum v. Heckler, a case from 1985.161 The
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals described a utilization
review board as an instrument of Medicare that reconciles
the dual goals of providing health care and encouraging
efficiency in the allocation of resources. The central issue in
the case was Medicare's requirement that patients use a
skilled nursing facility rather than an acute care facility if
the appropriate level of care could be provided in either
setting.162

157. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A) (2005).
158. 891 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1989).
159. See, e.g., Rush v. Parham, 625 F.2d 1150 (5th Cir. 1980) (requiring
Medicaid to provide coverage for a transsexual to have transgender surgery.
Medicaid is the program that provides medical coverage for qualified lowincome Americans and is administered by the same federal agency as
Medicare).
160. The Goodman decision also held that FDA approval of a technology did
not mean Medicare had to cover it. See Goodman, 891 F.2d at 451.
161. Lerum v. Heckler, 774 F.2d 210, 213 (7th Cir. 1985).
162. But see Hultzman v. Weinberger, 495 F.2d 1276, 1282 (3rd Cir. 1974)

620

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

In the case of New York v. Secretary of Health and
Human Services, a case from New York in 1990, the court
there held that the Secretary of Health and Human
Services' final decision regarding an individual's appeal of a
reasonable and necessary denial must be accurate and
supported by substantial evidence. 16 3 This standard of
review of a Medicare coverage decision could, theoretically,
make it more difficult to have implicit cost concerns guide a
coverage decision unless there was enough scientific
evidence to reasonably reach the same conclusion,
independent of cost.
These and related cases provide little guidance as to
how courts define "reasonable and necessary" for Medicare.
It seems that some consideration of cost is allowed, but it is
focused on the type of facility providing care. The concern
over using the appropriate facility goes back to the original
Medicare Act and was clearly envisioned by the drafters. In
the absence of substantial judicial guidance, the next step is
to analyze this issue according to theories of statutory
interpretation and agency law.
The issue of whether cost is a valid criterion for
Medicare to consider is, at one level, a question of an
agency's construction of the statute it administers. In this
case, the statute is the Medicare Act and the question
concerns the language at 42 U.S.C. section 1395y(a)(1)(A),
which prohibits Medicare from making payments for health
care that is not reasonable and necessary. In general, this
issue is analyzed with reference to the Supreme Court's
decision in Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. 164 and cases further interpreting that decision.
In Chevron, the Court devised a method for analyzing
agency action that gave broad deference to agency action.
This broad deference has been consistently applied since
1984, when Chevron was decided.
This article does not apply Chevron to the issue
discussed here, except as Chevron was interpreted by the
Supreme Court in March of 2000 in the case of FDA v.
(the court did not allow HCFA to overturn a utilization review board's decision
as to the appropriate setting for patient care).
163. New York v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 903 F.2d 122, 126 (2d.
Cir. 1990).
164. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corp., where the Court
considered the FDA's attempt to regulate tobacco as a
drug. 165 In FDA v. Brown, the moral argument for agency
action, attempting to limit the destruction caused by
cigarette smoking, is strong and clearly understood by the
Court. Tobacco kills and otherwise harms large numbers of
Americans. The FDA attempted to control it for the purpose
of saving lives. The Supreme Court struck down the
regulation and refused to allow the FDA to regulate in this
area. The Court decreed that Congress was the one to act
on this issue, not the FDA.
While the impact of FDA v. Brown may not be dramatic
for most agency actions, it appears to be highly relevant as
to the issue of cost and Medicare. FDA v. Brown has
presented a new analysis for agency action in certain
circumstances described below. In FDA v. Brown, the Court
describes the Chevron analysis. First, has Congress spoken
directly to the precise question at issue? If yes, that
Congressional language must be the answer and an agency
cannot defy it. If Congress has not directly and precisely
spoken to the question, the court has to respect an agency's
construction of its statute as long as it is a permissible
construction. 166 Agencies are given broad deference by
courts for two main reasons. The first is that a court is not
the proper place for assessing the wisdom of policy choices
from among competing visions. The second is due to an
to facts and circumstances
agency's presumed expertise as 167
related to the regulated subject.
In FDA v. Brown, the Court had no language in front of
it from Congress that specifically addressed whether the
FDA could regulate tobacco or not. Yet it held that the FDA
was prohibited from regulating tobacco on the grounds that
"Congress [had] directly spoken to the issue here and
precluded the FDA's jurisdiction to regulate tobacco
products."'168 In order to figure out if Congress specifically
addressed the question at issue, the Court did a broad
historical examination of both Congressional and FDA
behavior. It was not limited to legislative language that was
165. 529 U.S. 120, 132-33 (2000).
166. See id. at 132.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 133.
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passed, and was not limited to considering the FDA's
enabling statute. Most impressively, the Court said "we
must be guided to a degree by common sense as to the
manner in which Congress is likely to delegate a policy
decision of such economic and political magnitude to an
administrative agency." 169 This reliance on "common sense"
seemed to open the door to a vast array of information for
the Court to consider.
This decision clearly has implications for whether
Medicare's coverage criteria could withstand a judicial
challenge. To put it simply, the implications depend on how
one views the role of cost. Is cost-effectiveness merely a
sensible consideration, one already promoted by Congress
in the prospective payment system? Or is Medicare
attempting to embark on an explicit program to ration
health care for the elderly? The first formulation might very
well survive a Chevron analysis. The second is more
problematic.
There are different types of information the FDA v.
Brown Court considered that have relevance here. One
point was inconsistencies within what the FDA wished to
do with the existing regulatory structure. The FDA has an
obligation to determine if drugs are safe and effective.
Tobacco is not either one, and has no beneficial purpose.
Yet the FDA wished to create a regulatory structure for
tobacco that did not involve an outright ban. Applied to
Medicare, an inconsistency in considering cost in the
coverage area is that Congress enacted legislation
specifically addressing cost in the second step, payment,
and even included a cost-effectiveness evaluation as part of
this step. CMS would be making two separate cost
determinations, which appears to be redundant and does
not clearly fit within the scheme already created by
Congress.
In FDA v. Brown, the Court said it was relevant that
Congress considered and rejected bills that would have
given the FDA the authority to regulate tobacco. In the case
of Medicare, Congress has also considered and rejected bills
that would have given CMS explicit authority to create a
Medicare system that would work to ration health care. In
Part five of this paper, the PSRO plan is described in some
169. Id.
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detail, as is the radically different plan that became law. 170
Furthermore, the Court considered Congressional action
subsequent to the passage of the FDA Act on the issue of
tobacco to be proof that Congress did not consider the171power
If it
to regulate tobacco to be in the hands of the FDA.
had been, no further action on Congress' part would be
required.
Congressional tobacco laws were passed after the
problems with tobacco were well known. This relates to
Medicare because of Congress passing the prospective
payment system to address cost problems at Medicare.
Congress held hearings, proposed legislation and created a
payment structure clearly thinking about the cost of the
Medicare program as something that needed to be fixed.
Not to be repetitive, but Congress also put costeffectiveness into a specific place in this plan.
The Court in this case also considered past statements
by FDA senior officials who testified before Congress in
1965 that they did not have the power to regulate
tobacco. 172 This is more complex when the same issue is
considered as it applied to Medicare. Senior Medicare
officials have said they do not have the power to explicitly
consider cost 173 but many have also worried about cost and
have said cost will be part of their analysis. 174 The most
telling part of this analysis seems to be how the Court
assesses the nature of the question presented. The greater
the economic and political significance, the more likely the
Court will demand some substance to a delegation claim by
an agency. 75 The Court has made it clear in the next
decision discussed here that rationing of health care is an
area that needs to be guided by Congress.

170. See supra Part V.
171. See FDA v. Brown, 529 U.S. at 137.
172. Id. at 145 (quoting FDA Deputy Commissioner Rankin, Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising: Hearings on H.R. 2248 Before the House Comm. On

Interstateand Foreign Commerce, 89th Cong. 193 (1965)).
173. See supranotes 12-13 and accompanying text.
174. See supraPart I.
175. See FDA v. Brown, 529 U.S. at 159.
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In Pegram v. Herdrich,176 the Court described the HMO
Act as written to allow HMOs to ration health care. When
asked to determine what are good or bad rationing choices,
the Court said it could not do this. "[S]uch a debatable
social judgment [is] not wisely required of courts unless for
some reason resort cannot be had to the legislative process,
with its preferable forum for comprehensive investigations
and judgments of social value, such as optimum treatment
levels and health care expenditure."'177 Pegram v. Herdrich
seems to describe a subject of political significance, the
value judgment as to what are good and bad health care
rationing decisions. This subject is perhaps as significant as
tobacco was to the FDA v. Brown Court. It is not possible to
"prevent unelected interpreters from making value choices"
when agencies interpret statutes in difficult cases. 178 In our
current legislative environment, statutes are often written
for the purpose of creating regulatory agencies that need to
devise regulations in politically contentious areas. There
has to be some leeway given to these agencies to accomplish
this. The job here is to determine where the Court will find
a balance for Medicare coverage criteria.
FDA v. Brown appears to be a defense of Madisonian
principles of government. Jonathan Turley writes about
this in an article about FDA v. Brown and more generally
about tobacco. He believes that "in a Madisonian
democracy, it is more important how we resolve questions
than what we resolve."'179 The FDA appeared to be acting to
fill a void left by Congressional inaction to address a
terrible problem. However, to Turley, "the legislative
process works to take diverse opinions and produce a
common focal point that is acceptable to the majority."' 80
One point of our Madisonian system is to have a reliable
way to address divisive issues. The design is to "neutralize
18 1
division," and to minimize the power of factions.
176. 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
177. Id. at 221-22.
178. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 174

(1994).
179. Jonathan Turley, A Crisis of Faith: Tobacco and the Madisonian
Democracy, 37 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 433, 435 (2000).
180. Id. at 436.
181. Id. at 452.
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Congress is where the positions of the different factions are
meant to be forged into compromises acceptable to the
majority. The idea is to force "the debate and reconciliation
of differing public values."'18 2 Using this logic, if agencies
are permitted to step into a void created when Congress
cannot reach a majority decision on an issue, the act of
allowing agencies to do this threatens to empower factions,
which in turn threatens the underpinnings to the stability
of a highly diverse culture. The more volatile or difficult a
decision is, the more profoundly this concern applies.
However, at the same time the FDA v. Brown Court
defended Madisonian government, it also gave a reading to
the legislative history that is unusually expansive and
contrary to many theories in this area. As the dissent
pointed out, the Court is using the views of a later Congress
to interpret a statute enacted in 1938.183 But the Court has,
in the past, been opposed to this. The most striking member
of the majority in FDA v. Brown is Justice Scalia, who once
said in a concurring opinion: "[A]rguments based on
subsequent legislative history .8 .4 . should not be taken
seriously, not even in a footnote."
Following the original intent of the original legislature
that drafted a statute is a theory that is strongly held by
many and has been around for centuries. 8 5 There are also
many who have pointed out the numerous problems with
this theory.' 8 6 One main problem is that times and
was
change. Often, original intent
circumstances
formulated when current circumstances were not remotely
imagined. Another problem is more complex. True
legislative intent is very difficult to know. Legislators
utilize game theory when promoting and negotiating
statutes. What is said, or enacted, is often motivated by
reasons that are unknowable by an observer. For example,
someone could vote for a bill in order to get someone else to
vote for another bill. The sheer number of issues being

182. Id. at 453.
183. See 539 U.S. at 161 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
184. FDA v. Brown, 529 U.S. at 182 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Justice
Scalia's opinion in Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 632 (1990)).
185. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 178, at 14.

186. For example, see supra note 178.
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negotiated at any one time makes it difficult to know who
intends what, and when.
Because times change, an agency's job can be
substantially different from what it once was. A certain
degree of flexibility, of growth, in an agency's realm of
power is essential to developing a dynamic agency. The
dynamic agency is one that can best promote the more
general, underlying goals it was set up to further. 8 7 In the
case of Medicare, times have changed, but the changes
came almost immediately after the passage of the bill.
Medicare's costs soon skyrocketed. The original intent of the
Medicare Statute appears to be unusually clear. The goal
was to provide coverage. The scope of coverage was
determined by how many votes were needed and which
coverage plan would get those votes. There was also some
fear of voters being angry if an empty promise of coverage
was made. A very generous payment plan was enacted to
quiet the medical establishment, primarily voiced through
the AMA. As is often quoted, the goal was to bring "the best
of American medicine" to the elderly.188
When a situation changes and Congress fails to act,
that is when it might be crucial for agencies to be given
leeway. Rather than seeing this Congressional failure as
evidence of a robust Madisonian system at work, it could be
evidence of special interest groups controlling Congress or
of Congress lacking courage. In Medicare, it is the
accusation of absence of Congressional fortitude that has
the greatest resonance. As described earlier in this paper, it
has long been considered political suicide for an elected
official to try and limit health care. 8 9 While the
government does not provide for all of the care people need,
once the government does make a promise in this area it is
almost impossible to back away from it.190 The programs
are considered "politically sacrosanct."' 9'

187. See generally ESKRIDGE, supra note 178.
188. See, for example, supra note 139.
189. See Milhorn Interview, supra note 17.
190. FEDERAL HEALTH PROGRAMS: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS x (Stuart H.

Altman & Harvey M. Sapolsky eds., 1981).
191. Id.
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In an area such as medical care, the problem of "tragic
choices" makes it even more politically difficult for Congress
to act to make explicit changes. In the book Tragic Choices,
Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbitt examine the way
societies handle allocations of scarce resources. Certain
choices society makes determine which guiltless person will
suffer and which will not. 192 Sometimes these decisions are
based on resource allocations that are difficult to defend,
but often a policy maker must choose between competing
justifiable notions of what is the best use of a resource. By
not expressly acting, a tragic choice can often be made
implicitly, a far less dangerous political act. 193 The implicit
choice risks being less rational. In medicine, this
irrationality can result in health programs spending limited
dollars in ways not calculated to get the greatest health
return.
By giving responsibility for a tragic choice to a federal
agency, there is hope that the agency could be sufficiently
shielded from political pressure to actually respond to the
problem and generate the best utilitarian result. The
experience with Medicare so far would not support an
agency being the best to explicitly tackle the problem of cost
of health care. CMS's attempts at proposing cost criteria
have failed on two levels. The proposals have received
194
negative responses that have prevented their enactment.
Worse, it is unclear if even the first regulation, proposed in
1989, would serve to protect Medicare from the greatest
financial threats posed by new medical technology. As
stated earlier, medicine can be both extremely effective and
extremely expensive. It would appear that up to this point,
it is the less overt cost considerations, such as the ones in
the heart transplant case, that have proven to be capable of

192. GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES: THE CONFLICTS
SOCIETY CONFRONTS IN THE ALLOCATION OF TRAGICALLY SCARCE RESOURCES 17

(1978).
193. Implicit choices are often balanced by rescue impulses. These spring
from the relationship between first order and second order allocation choices,
those we make for society generally and those we make when confronted with
an individual in need. An example of this tension in the book Tragic Choices
involves a first order decision to not have a shore patrol along a beach but a
concurrent second order willingness to spend a million dollars to save a single
downed ballonist. CALABRESI & BOBBITT, supra note 192, at 21.
194. See Tunis, supra note 155.
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protecting Medicare from unbearable financial strain. This
phenomenon fits both the Tragic Choices analysis of what
we can stand to decide as a society and the accepted notions
as to the political impossibility of an explicit rationing
decision surviving in this area.
The political danger in tampering with the coverage
provided by the Medicare Program can be understood using
the concept of the super-statute, discussed in an article by
William Eskridge and John Ferejohn. 195 These statutes are
the few that "penetrate public normative and institutional
culture in a deep way." 196 A super-statute (1) seeks to
establish a new normative or institutional framework for
state policy, (2) sticks in the public culture so that (3) the
statute and its principles have a broad effect on the law,
including beyond the law of the specific statute. 197 The law
is usually enacted to fix a particularly "vexing" social or
economic problem, and proves robust as a solution,
standard or norm over time. 198 Then, its policy and
principles become axiomatic to the culture.199 The
legitimacy of a super-statute comes from the feedback of the
200
populace, experts, and government officials.
The article lays out canons of statutory interpretation
for super-statutes. More relevant here, however, is the
quality of resonance to the public of these statutes that
Eskridge and Ferejohn describe. If the Medicare Act is a
super-statute and its promise to care for the elderly has
sunk into the fabric of this culture, that promise is
deserving of an elevated level of respect. It is almost
impossible to know in advance if express rationing would be
considered a violation of the promise. The implicit rationing
that has occurred could, when exposed, provoke a powerful
reaction.
Mark Hall has written on the role of trust in medical
care. He asserts that trust is the glue that holds the doctor195. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J.
1215 (2001).
196. Id. at 1215.
197. Id. at 1216.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1217.
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patient relationship together and makes it possible. 20 1 He
also asserts that preserving, justifying, and enhancing trust
is a critical project for health care law, public policy and
medical ethics. 20 2 He posits that health care trust is
different from other types of trust, such as the trust in
commercial transactions, and is more important for the
success of health care than for other arenas. 20 3 If he is right,
the exposure of covert cost considerations and a shift to
overt cost considerations could serve to fracture the trust of
the public.
If Medicare is a super-statute, and if trust is an
essential element of our health care system, it will be
politically costly for whoever accomplishes a shift to overt
cost considerations, be it an agency, Congress, or the courts,
and will be subject to correction. 20 4 The proposed
regulations never became actual regulations. Catastrophic
coverage, perceived as a challenge to Medicare, was
repealed by Congress. The courts have not yet had an
opportunity to speak on this, but FDA v. Brown gives them
ample ammunition should they need it.
The last major question is whether CMS is both
qualified and capable of making the cost-based choices it
wants to make. It needs to be clear that our efforts to create
a just health care system take place "in the face of a force
for whom justification is irrelevant. '205 That force is illness.
Health disparities are often beyond our control whereas
access to health care often depends on societal choices.
Illness can be grossly unfair. Medicare seems to have been
an attempt to provide a limited scope of protection from the
financial burden of the predictable gross unfairness of
illness for the elderly.
Agency law requires an agency to have a rational claim
or basis for its action. Congress does not have the same

201. Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463, 470
(2002).
202. Id. at 470-71.
203. Id. at 471.
204. See Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 195, at 1252.
205. Jerry L. Mashaw, Small Things Like Reason Are Put In A Jar: Reason
and Legitimacy in The Administrative State, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 17, 18 (2001)

(summarizing Carl Jung on the relationship between God and Job).
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obligation. 206 We know Congress made economically
irrational promises in the original Medicare Act to convince
physicians and hospitals to participate in the Medicare
system. 207 The structure of the coverage decision, paying for
care that is reasonable and necessary, may have the same
flaw, that of economic irrationality. Because Congress' will
shapes an agency's responsibilities, CMS might very well
have been given an impossible task. This task would be to
develop national coverage criteria that accomplish some
form of savings without depriving anyone of the care they
need. Presuming a complex, if not impossible task, CMS
has to carefully legitimate what it does with these criteria
on the basis of the rationality of the choices it makes.
Jerry Mashaw wrote on the different types of agency
action and the different types of rationality that need to
support them. 208 Relevant here is a concept called social
rationality. 20 9 The justification called for in issues of social
rationality is the rightness or justice-furthering quality of
the decision being made. Medicare moves from fact-finding
regarding efficacy of a medical technology, and moves
towards making decisions about the social value of a
technology when it considers cost. The form of the
underlying rational needs to shift to match the change in
the type of decision the agency is making.
Agencies generally shy away from acknowledging they
are making value judgments, claiming that the values they
apply are specified in their statutes. 210 Yet cost-benefit
analysis is an attempt to increase social welfare by crafting
a rule properly. 211 A broad cost-effectiveness analysis
attempts to do much the same. A decision to limit the
availability of medical technology because of its cost is

206. See id. at 19.
207. One could say Congress either created a highly inflationary system
that gave away the store or one could say that Congress created a structure
that deprived it of the power to use Medicare's market power to negotiate lower
costs. Either description may have been politically necessary but probably
resulted in a more expensive Medicare program.
208. See Mashaw, supra note 205, at 30.
209. Mashaw uses this term and theory to build on the work of the
philosopher Jurgen Habermas. See id. at 30.
210. See id. at 32.
211. See id. at 33.
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clearly a value judgment. Somewhere in this specific
decision is a more broad determination that at a certain
point in medical care, the cost is more than the country
should spend. If CMS fails to justify its coverage decisions
with reference to social rationality, the decisions in this
critical area will probably fail to appear legitimate. Leaving
out crucial parts of the reasoning process in public
communications delegitimizes the end result. However, to
expressly acknowledge what they are really addressing is
almost impossible in the current political and social
environment.
CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the Congressional directive to HHS to
make available to the public the factors considered in
decisions for Medicare
making national coverage
beneficiaries has brought to the forefront a number of
problems for Medicare. Medicare has considered cost when
making decisions about coverage of expensive medical
technology. Cost has shaped coverage decisions. At different
times, various HHS and CMS staff have called for the
importance of considering cost.
One can consider cost in two broad ways. The first is to
determine when something is too expensive to pay for,
given its overall expense to the Medicare program and
without considering its potential health benefits to
Medicare beneficiaries. The second is to assess the costeffectiveness of technology. 212 Cost-effectiveness has been
proposed as a criterion but has never been officially adopted
as Medicare policy in coverage decisions. However, it is
used in determining how much to pay once coverage is
approved.
If CMS includes cost in any manner in the factors for
national coverage determinations, it faces a difficult process
of justifying the consideration, given the potent political
and social ramifications. Congress has not given CMS the
explicit power to do this. Recent Supreme Court cases imply
the Court could overturn a CMS action in this area, finding
Congress to be the proper place for this type of decision to
be made. Furthermore, CMS has never proposed

212. Cost-benefit analysis has not been expressly proposed by Medicare.
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considering cost considerations beyond cost-effectiveness.
However, CMS may be unable to function properly as
regards stewardship of the Medicare program if it doesn't
consider the absolute cost of new technology as part of
coverage decisions.
The ramifications of Medicare's coverage factors are
immense. Coverage decisions tend to be followed by nongovernmental payers as regards their own coverage. The
factors that Medicare chooses have a strong likelihood of
becoming the factors that govern all non-governmental
United States coverage decisions. By compelling Medicare
to explicitly state the factors that go into coverage
decisions, Congress has brought this conflict to a head.
Gregg Bloche has written on hidden rationing of health
care. 213 He argues that making rationing less visible
"lowers the profile of health care equity concerns on the
political agenda. '214 If this is true, the corollary should
apply. Making rationing more visible is likely to increase its
political profile. This adds further support to the idea that
Congress should brace itself for what is likely to follow its
directive to HHS. Medicare does not have the capacity to
resolve the political and social issues that it must in order
to both protect the program's financial integrity and protect
the beneficiaries. Given the social importance of Medicare,
this failure will be powerfully felt.
This article's goal is to make clear the importance and
complexity of this issue and to call for Congressional action.
While the political costs are clear and it is hard not to both
understand and have empathy for legislators facing this
challenge, Congress has failed both HHS and the country
by allowing this problem to go unaddressed. Some guidance
must be given to Medicare as to how Congress expects it to
grapple with extremely expensive, medically effective
technology. The political risks, great as they are, do not
excuse Congressional inaction, especially in light of their
recent legislation. Furthermore, the issue of how much we
are willing to pay for new and expensive medical technology
needs to be addressed. It is far too easy to envision the
appearance of technologies that we simply cannot afford to

213. M. Gregg Bloche, Trust and Betrayal in the Medical Marketplace, 55
STAN.L. REV. 919 (2002).

214. Id. at 941.
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provide to all who might benefit from them. A mechanism
needs to be developed for handling this problem both
pragmatically and ethically.

